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As society becomes more dependent upon computer systems to perform increasingly
critical tasks, ensuring those systems do not fail also becomes more important. Many
organizations depend heavily on desktop computers for day to day operations. Un-
fortunately, the software that runs on these computers is still written by humans and
as such, is still subject to human error and consequent failure. A natural solution is
to use statistical machine learning to predict failure. However, since failure is still
a relatively rare event, obtaining labelled training data to train these models is not
trivial. This work presents new simulated fault loads with an automated framework
to predict failure in the Microsoft enterprise authentication service and Apache web
server in an effort to increase up-time and improve mission effectiveness. These new
fault loads were successful in creating realistic failure conditions that are accurately
identified by statistical learning models.
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DATA DRIVEN DEVICE FAILURE PREDICTION
I. Introduction
As dependency upon computers grows, so too do the associated risks. Computer
systems are all around us. Some of these systems play insignificant roles in our lives
while others are responsible for sustaining our lives. Unfortunately, the software that
controls these systems is written by humans and consequently subject to human er-
ror. As a result, these systems are prone to failure, and in some cases that failure
has catastrophic consequences. Every day, critical infrastructure and Air Force mis-
sion systems depend on the reliability of computer systems. As a result, being able
to predict pending failure in computer systems can offer tremendous and potentially
life-saving applications in today’s technologically advanced world. There has been
significant work over the past several decades attempting to make educated predic-
tions about the failure of machines through the use of machine learning algorithms [1].
Unfortunately, much of this work has gone unused.
Failure has been defined as an undesirable event resulting from a software fault
or error [1]. There are a number of ways to reduce the number of errors produced
by a piece of software, but the software development life-cycle is shrinking, and less
time and effort are being devoted to reducing errors before deployment [4]. Real-time
error prevention or handling can address this deficiency. In recent years, it seems
the en vogue solution to this problem is to make massively redundant systems that
can withstand failure [5]. As hardware becomes more affordable, this is an effective
approach in many ways, but ultimately is still not cost efficient. Consequently, this
research focuses on a small piece of the general field of reliable computing: Online
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Failure Prediction (OFP). OFP is the act of attempting to predict when failures are
likely so that they can be avoided. Chapter II outlines the recent work done in this
field, much of which is not done in production environments due to the complex
and manual task of training a prediction model. If the underlying system changes,
the efficacy of a prediction model can be drastically reduced until it is retrained.
Furthermore, training requires access to labelled training data. Since failure is such
a rare event, access to this type of training data may not be possible.
Irrera, et al. [2] presented a framework in 2015 to automate the process of dy-
namically generating failure data and using it to train a predictor after an underlying
system change. This framework is called the Adaptive Failure Prediction (AFP)
framework and this research explores an implementation of it. More specifically, this
research presents results after implementing a modernized AFP framework using a
Microsoft (MS) Windows Server Domain Controller (DC) that is capable of generat-
ing more diverse and specific failure data for training. Successive software updates are
then applied until the model selected becomes useless, the framework is then allowed
to re-train a new more effective predictor. Finally, the implementation is validated
by running the same experiment on a web server.
1.1 Problem Statement
According to the operational community, predicting and alerting against impend-
ing network service failures currently uses thresholds and rules on discrete items in
enterprise system logs. For example, if the Central Processing Unit (CPU) and mem-
ory usage on a device exceeds 90%, then an alert may be issued. This approach works,
but only for certain types of failures. In order to minimize the false positives, it only
makes recommendations when the system has already entered a degraded performance
mode. To maintain network resilience, the operational organizations responsible for
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communications support desperately need some means of gaining prediction accuracy
and lead-time before a service failure or degradation occurs.
To increase that lead time and make more accurate predictions, this research
explores predicting failure by analyzing data reported by a target system. Preceding
a service failure event, multiple indicators from disparate sources, perhaps over a
long period of time, may appear in system logs. The log entries of interest are also
quite rare compared with normal operations. Because of these constraints, identifying
failure indicators can be nearly impossible for humans to perform. Further, in most
cases, restoring service is more important than identifying the indicators that may or
may not have existed.
Failure prediction can be approached in several ways. For example, the simplest
approach is to use everyday statistical analysis to determine the mean time between
failures of specific components. The analysis of all components making up a system
can be aggregated to make predictions about that system using a set of statistics-based
or business-relevant rules. Unfortunately, the complexity of modern architectures
has outpaced such static statistical-based analysis. OFP differs from other means
of failure prediction in that it focuses on classifying the current running state of a
machine as either failure prone or not, or in such a way that it describes the confidence
in how failure prone a system is at a given moment in time [1].
In recent years much of the work in OFP has gone unused due to the dramatic
decrease in cost and complexity involved in building hardware-based redundant sys-
tems [2]. Furthermore, in most cases, OFP implements machine learning algorithms
that require manual re-training after underlying system changes. More troubling is
that system changes are becoming more frequent as the software development life cy-
cle moves toward a more continuous integration model. To help solve these challenges,
Irrera, et al. [2] introduced a framework that uses simulated faults to automatically
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re-train a prediction algorithm to make implementing OFP approaches easier. This
work extends that framework to capture developments since its writing and general-
ize it so it works for a broader class of devices by exploring and developing the fault
load. Specifically, this work explores additional and more realistic types of faults,
modernizes the fault injection tool by translating it from the IA32 architecture to the
x86-64 architecture, and explores the use of reported errors or log messages instead
of system health information.
1.2 Hypothesis
An implementation of the AFP framework with a more representative fault load
for the MS Windows enterprise infrastructure using data in log messages is hypoth-
esized to lead to accurate failure prediction with better lead time than is available
today without any prediction model. This hypothesis is tested by implementing the
AFP framework in a scaled virtual environment and evaluating its performance after
successive software updates. To validate the approach, the same AFP framework
implementation is evaluated against an Apache web server.
Specifically, additional fault loads are explored because in modern versions of the
Windows operating system, there are hundreds of thousands of possible fault injection
points. Finding one that will be activated in a realistic way can be difficult. Prior to
this research, the faults produced and consequently predicted by the AFP framework
were difficult to find and also were the result of first-order faults. This research
evaluates the performance of the AFP framework when targeted second and third
order faults are introduced. Additionally, the implementation of the AFP framework
was not possible on modern MS Windows infrastructure because the fault injection
tool used had not been written for the x86-64 architecture. Further, it was incapable
of injecting faults in protected system processes.
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Finally, the initial case study of the AFP framework used system health infor-
mation to train the prediction model. As is pointed out by Salfner, et al. [1], this
sort of prediction may have difficulty distinguishing between normal operations and
actual errors which may evolve into failure. This work explores the use of reported
errors to train the model instead to overcome this shortcoming. It is expected that
this modification will allow for more accurate predictions.
1.3 Research Goals
A goal of this research is to develop a machine learning based failure prediction
model to predict failures in enterprise network services. This research should demon-
strate the efficacy of the AFP framework and proposed extensions when used on the
MS Windows enterprise architecture. A long-term goal of this research is to drive the
improvement of the AFP framework and increase its adoption and resulting cost sav-
ings. In the near-term, the increased representativeness of the faults generated should
lead to better predictions and increased availability in enterprise services. Finally, the
translation of the IA32 General Software Fault Injection Technique (G-SWFIT) tool
to the x86-64 architecture should enable the same advantages of software fault injec-
tion for 32-bit systems on 64-bit systems [3].
1.4 Impact of Research
Every day, many of the Air Force’s critical missions depend on computer infras-
tructure. An essential piece of this infrastructure is the authentication mechanisms
that protect sensitive information. Unfortunately, the software at the core of this in-
frastructure is written and maintained by humans and thus susceptible human error.
This research will enable the Air Force and many others that use the MS Enterprise
Infrastructure to accurately predict pending service outages thereby providing lead-
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time in order to avoid those outages. The result is cost savings in personnel and
equipment. Further advantages are difficult to quantify such as a decreased risk of
mission failure due to network service outage.
1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
This research assumes indicators of failure are present and available with enough
lead-time to accurately make decisions and take mitigation action should failure be
predicted based on these indicators. Furthermore, it has not been proven possible to
accurately predict future events without a priori knowledge. This research presents
a method of predicting failure, but this method is completely useless at predicting
act of God events. Finally, this method is capable of predicting system failure based
on underlying software faults and not indicators about malicious attacks against the
target system.
1.6 Results
This research shows that the additional fault loads used in conjunction with the
modernized AFP framework enable the generation of failure data that can be used
to train predictors to alert on pending failure with better precision and recall than
is currently available today. Furthermore, without this modernization, the use of the
AFP framework would not have been possible on modern MS Windows operating
systems. The results of this work demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach by
showing that these new fault loads and modernized framework work on both the MS
DC as well as a MS web server.
This research also shows that after an underlying system change, this method
of predicting failure is capable of automatically training a more effective prediction
algorithm so that this technique can be implemented on an Air Force network with
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little to no impact on manpower. Consequently, it is expected that this research will
inform decision makers and allow them to implement this technique in a production
environment.
1.7 Summary
This work outlines a technique that is effective in predicting failure in modern
MS Windows systems that can adapt to underlying system changes. The remain-
der of this document will outline exactly how this modernization and the additional
fault loads were implemented and tested. The impact of this work is that it could
readily be adapted and implemented in many enterprise system architectures with
little manpower burden. Specifically, in the Air Force, it could most effectively be
implemented and used by the Cyber Security and Control System (CSCS) weapon
system employed at the 561st and 83d Network Operation Squadrons (NOS) and their
associated detachments to reduce the number of network service outages, increasing
uptime, leading to improved mission effectiveness in both the support and operational
domains. Finally, this technique is general enough to be employed outside of the Air
Force to increase mission effectiveness across the Department of Defense (DOD). Ex-
ternal to the DOD, this research further generalizes an approach that could be used
to help increase availability of nearly any computer system.
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II. Overview of Online Failure Prediction (OFP)
Traditionally, failure is predicted using statistical information about past failures
oﬄine before a system is implemented. Unfortunately, given the complexity of mod-
ern computer systems and the nearly infinite number of ways in which they can be
configured, this sort of oﬄine analysis is not helpful. OFP is the act of evaluating a
running system in real time to make a prediction about what the future state will be.
This chapter reviews current research regarding OFP and its many approaches to
build a foundation for this research. Further, the taxonomy of approaches developed
by Salfner, et al. [1], is updated by classifying approaches since its publication and
creating a new sub-category. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In
Section 2.1, a brief background on the topic of OFP is given including definitions,
terminology, and measures of performance used by the community. In Section 2.2,
the approaches relevant to this research are presented. This chapter then concludes
with a brief summary.
2.1 Background
In 2010, Salfner, et al. [1] published a survey paper that provides a comprehensive
summary of the state of the art on the topic of OFP. In addition to the review of
the literature up to the point of publication, they provide a summary of definitions
and measures of performance commonly used in the community for couching the
OFP discussion. The remainder of this section reviews those definitions to build a
foundation for the rest of this work.
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2.1.1 Definitions.
2.1.1.1 Proactive Fault Management (PFM).
Salfner, et al. [1] define PFM as the process by which faults are handled in a
proactive way, analogous with fault tolerance and basically consisting of four steps:
OFP, diagnosis, action scheduling, and action execution as shown in Figure 1. The
final three stages of PFM define how much lead time is required to avoid a failure
when predicted during OFP. Lead time is defined as the time between when failure
is predicted and when that failure will occur. Lead time is one of the most critical
elements of a failure prediction approach.
OFP is defined as the first step in PFM shown in Figure 1. OFP is the act of
analyzing the running state of a system in order to predict failure in that system.
Once failure has been predicted, a fault tolerant system must determine what will
cause the failure. This stage is called the diagnosis stage or “root-cause analysis”
stage. During the diagnosis stage, analysis must be conducted to identify possible
remediation actions. After it is determined what will cause a failure, a fault tolerant
system must schedule a remediation action that is either performed by an opera-
tor or done automatically. This stage is known as the action scheduling stage and
normally takes as input the cost of performing an action, confidence in prediction,
effectiveness/complexity of remedy action and makes a decision about what action
to perform based on that input. In some cases a remedy action can be so simple
Figure 1. The stages of proactive fault management [1].
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that even if the confidence in the prediction is low, the action can still be performed
with little impact on the overall system and its users. A thorough analysis of the
trade-off between cost of avoidance and confidence in prediction and the associated
benefits is described in [6]. Finally, in order to avoid failure, a system must execute
the scheduled remediation action or let an operator know which actions can be taken
in a stage called action execution.
2.1.1.2 Faults, Errors, Symptoms, and Failures.
This research uses the definitions from [7] as interpreted and extended in [1] for
the following terms: failure; error (detected versus undetected); fault; and symptom.
Failure is an event that occurs when the delivered service deviates from correct
service. In other words, things can go wrong internally; as long as the output of a
system is what is expected, failure has not occurred.
An error is the part of the total state of the system that may lead to its subsequent
service failure. Errors are characterized as the point when things go wrong [1]. Fault
tolerant systems can handle errors without necessarily evolving into failure. There
are two kinds of errors. First, a detected error is an error that is reported to a
logging service. In other words, if it can be seen in a log then it is a detected error.
Second, undetected errors are errors that have not been identified by an error detector.
Undetected errors are things like memory leaks. The error exists, but as long as there
is usable memory, it is not likely to be reported to a logging service. Once the system
runs out of usable memory, undetected errors will likely appear in logs and become a
detected errors. A fault is the hypothesized root cause of an error. Faults can remain
dormant for some time before manifesting themselves and causing an incorrect system
state. In the memory leak example, the missing free statement in the source code
would be the fault.
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A symptom is an out-of-norm behavior of a system’s parameters caused by errors,
whether detected or undetected. In the memory leak example, a possible symptom of
the error might be delayed response times due to sluggish performance of the overall
system.
Figure 2 illustrates how a software fault can evolve into a failure. Faults, errors,
symptoms, and failures can be further categorized by how they are detected also
shown in Figure 2. Salfner, et al. [1] introduces a taxonomy of OFP approaches and
classifies failure prediction approaches by the stage at which a fault is detected as it
evolves into a failure: auditing, reporting, monitoring, and tracking. Testing is left
out because it does not help detect faults in an online sense.
Figure 3 demonstrates the timeline associated with OFP. The parameters used by
the community to define a predictor are as follows:
• Present Time: t
• Data Window: ∆td, represents the time window of data used for a predictor to
make its assessment.
• Minimal Warning Time: ∆tw, is the amount of time required to avoid a failure
if one is predicted.
• Lead Time: ∆tl, represents the time between when failure is predicted and
when that failure will occur.
• Prediction Period: ∆tp, is the time for which a prediction is valid. As ∆tp →
∞, the accuracy of the predictor approaches 100% because every system will
eventually fail. As this happens, the usefulness of a predictor is diminished.
As the above parameters are adjusted, predictors can become more or less useful.
For example, it is clear that as a predictor looks further into the future potentially
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Figure 2. How faults and errors evolve into failure with the associated methods for
detection represented by enclosing gray boxes [1].
Figure 3. The timeline for OFP [1].
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increasing lead time, confidence in its prediction is likely to be reduced. On the other
hand, if lead time is too small, or ∆tl < ∆tw, there will likely not be enough time to
effectively take remediation action. In general, OFP approaches seek to find a balance
between the parameters, within an acceptable bound depending on application, to
achieve the best possible performance.
2.2 Approaches to OFP
2.2.1 OFP Taxonomy.
The taxonomy by Salfner, et al. [1] classifies many of the OFP approaches in the
literature into four major categories. These four major categories are defined by the
four techniques used to detect faults in real-time: auditing, monitoring, reporting,
and tracking as illustrated in Figure 2. The taxonomy is shown in Figure 4.
Since this research focusses on real-time data-driven device failure prediction ap-
proaches, our focus is on the reporting category of Salfner’s taxonomy. The reporting
category organizes failure prediction techniques that attempt to classify a state as
failure prone based on reported errors. This is different from prediction methods
that rely on observing the current state of a machine such as auditing and monitor-
ing. As pointed out by Salfner, et al. [1], in general these methods have difficulty
distinguishing a system under peak load and one that may be about to fail.
The reporting category of the taxonomy is further organized into five sub-categories:
rule-based systems; co-occurrence; pattern recognition; statistical tests; and classi-
fiers.
Rule-Based Systems attempt to classify a system as being failure-prone or not
based a set of conditions met by reported errors. Since modern systems are far too
complex to build a set of conditions manually, these approaches seek to find auto-
mated ways of identifying these conditions in training data. Co-occurrence predictors
13
Figure 4. Taxonomy of approaches to online failure prediction [1]. The two categories
into which this research falls are highlighted.
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generate failure predictions based on the reported errors that occur either spatially or
temporally close together. Pattern Recognition predictors attempt to classify patterns
of reported errors as failure prone. Statistical Tests attempt to classify a system as
failure-prone based on statistical analysis of historical data. For example, if a system
is generating a much larger volume of error reports than it typically does, it may be
a sign of pending failure. Classifiers assign labels to given sets of error reports in
training data and then make failure predictions based on observed labels in real-time
data.
This research focusses on pattern recognition OFP approaches, which are shown
in Figure 5. Strategies employed in the other sub-categories are closely related and
thus are also explored in this research.
2.2.2 Data-Driven OFP.
2.2.2.1 Pattern Recognition.
Salfner, et al. [8] proposed an approach to predicting failures by learning patterns
of similar events using a semi-Markov chain model. The model learned patterns of
error reports that led to failure by mapping the reported errors to the states in the
Markov chain and predicted the probability of the transition to a failure-prone state.
They tested the model using performance failures of a telecommunication system
and reported a precision of 0.8, recall of 0.923, and an F-measure of 0.8571, which
drastically outperformed the models to which it was compared.
Figure 5. How pattern recognition is accomplished in reported errors [1].
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Given the results, the semi-Markov Chain model is compelling however, it de-
pends on the sequence of reported errors to remain constant in order to be effective.
Today, most software is multi-threaded or distributed so there is no guarantee that
the sequence of reported errors will remain constant. Further, the authors reported
that this approach did not scale well as the complexity of the reported errors grew.
In 2007, Salfner, et al. extended their previous work in [8] using semi-Markov
models [9]. They generalized the Hidden Semi-Markov process for a continuous-
time model and called it the Generalized Hidden Semi-Markov Model (GHSMM). By
making this generalization, the model was able to effectively predict the sequence of
similar events (or in this case, errors) in the continuous time domain. The authors
then tested the model and training algorithm using telecommunication performance
failure data and compared it to three other approaches. While this GHSMM model
did not perform as well as their previous work, it did outperform the models to which
it was compared and more importantly did not depend on the sequence of reported
errors. In other words, this new GHSMM model predicted failure for permutations
of a known failure-prone sequence making it more suited for a distributed or parallel
system.
The GHSMM approach has been well received by the community, although ap-
pears to be limited in use to a single system. Unfortunately, this approach as well as
its predecessor, does not scale well and does not adapt to changes to the underlying
system without retraining.
2.2.2.2 Classifiers.
Domeniconi, et al. [10] published a technique that used a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) to classify the present state as either failure prone or not based on a window
of error reports as an input vector. As Salfner points out in [1], this SVM approach
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would not be useful without some sort of transformation of the input vector since
the exact same sequence of error messages, rotated by one message, would not be
classified as similar. To solve this permutation challenge, the authors in [10] used
singular value decomposition to isolate the sequence of error reports that led to a
failure.
This SVM approach used training data from a production computer environment
with 750 hosts over a period of 30 days. The types of failures the system was trying
to detect was the inability to route to a web-page and an arbitrary node being down.
Many approaches involving SVMs have been explored since and seem to be popular
in the community [2, 10–13].
2.2.2.3 Hybrid Approaches.
Fujitsu Labs has published several papers on an approach for predicting failure
in a cloud-computing environment [14–16]. Watanabe, et al. [15, 16] report on find-
ings after applying a Bayesian learning approach to detect patterns in similar log
messages. Their approach abstracts the log messages by breaking them down into
single words and categorizing them based on the number of identical words between
multiple messages. This hybrid approach removes the details from the messages, like
node identifier, and Internet Protocol (IP) address while retaining meaning of the log
message.
Watanabe et al.’s [16] hybrid approach attempts to solve the problem of underlying
system changes by learning new patterns of messages in real-time. As new messages
come in, the model actively updates the probability of failure by Bayesian inference
based on the number of messages of a certain type that have occurred within a certain
time window. The authors claim that their approach solves three problems: 1) The
model is not dependent upon a certain lexicon used to report errors to handle different
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messages from different vendors; 2) The model does not take into account the order of
messages so that in a distributed environment where messages may arrive in different
orders, the model is still effective; and 3) The model actively retrains itself so manual
re-training does not need to occur after system updates. The model was then tested
in a cloud environment over a ninety day period. The authors reported a precision
of 0.8 and a recall of 0.9, resulting in an F-measure of 0.847.
Fronza, et al. [11] introduced a pattern-recognition/classifier hybrid approach that
used an SVM to detect patterns in log messages that would lead to failure. The
authors used random indexing to solve the problem previously discussed of SVMs
failing to classify two sequences as similar if they are offset by one error report. The
authors report that their predictor was able to almost perfectly detect non-failure
conditions but was poor at identifying failures. The authors then weighted the SVMs
to account for this discrepancy by assigning a larger penalty for false negatives than
false positives and had better results.
2.2.3 Industry Approaches to OFP.
Because hardware has become so easy to acquire, industry has sought to avoid
the problem of software failure by implementing massive redundancy in their systems.
The work in [2, 16] attributes the problem avoidance to the fact that until recently,
implementing and maintaining a failure predictor was difficult. As we decrease the
length of the software development life cycle, software updates are being published
with increasing frequency leading to rapid changes in underlying systems. These
changes can often render a predictor useless without re-training, which is often a
manual and resource intensive process.
Redundancy is not without problems however. Implementing redundant systems
to avoid the failure problem can be expensive and can add overhead and complexity
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making a system more difficult to manage.
2.2.4 Adaptive Failure Prediction (AFP) Framework.
The AFP framework by Irrera, et al. [2] shown in Figure 6, presents a new approach
to maintaining the efficacy of failure predictors given underlying system changes. The
authors conducted a case study implementing the framework using virtualization and
fault injection on a web server.
Figure 6. The AFP framework [2].
The framework built upon past work by Irrera, et al. [17, 18] to generate failure
data by injecting software faults using a tool based on General Software Fault Injection
Technique (G-SWFIT) [3] in a virtual environment for comparing and automatically
re-training predictors. With the introduction of the framework, Irrera, et al. [2] report
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results of a case-study. After implementing the AFP framework using a web server
and an SVM predictor, they report that their findings demonstrate their framework
is able to adapt to changes to an underlying system which would normally render a
predictor unusable.
In general, the use of simulated data is not well received by the community, how-
ever the authors in [18,19] report evidence supporting the claim that simulated failure
data is representative of real failure data. Further, the authors suggest that since sys-
tems are so frequently updated and failures are in general rare events, real failure
data is often not available. Moreover, the literature shows that even if there is a
certain type of failure in training data and a predictor can detect and predict that
type of error accurately, it will still miss failures not present in the training data. By
injecting the types of faults that one can expect, each failure type is represented in
the training data.
Irrera, et al. [2] reported good results and concluded that the AFP framework
is an effective tool. Unfortunately, the AFP framework is not a universal solution
and requires significant work to be implemented on a modern Microsoft (MS) Win-
dows enterprise network. Furthermore, the fault load previously explored does not
completely represent all possible failures [20].
2.3 Summary
This chapter covered the definitions, measures of performance, and approaches
that are relevant to this research as organized under the subsection of reporting
within the OFP field of study. There has been a tremendous amount of research
surrounding the topic of OFP and many prediction approaches have been presented.
Unfortunately, these approaches do not appear on modern operational systems and
failures are still relatively prevalent. Recent approaches as covered here have sought
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to make predictors more adaptive to the changes in underlying systems in an effort to
make implementing existing failure predictors easier. In this work, we plan to extend
the AFP framework and further generalize the approach.
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III. Methodology
The purpose of the Adaptive Failure Prediction (AFP) framework is to automate
the generation of realistic labelled failure data for the purposes of automatically train-
ing a failure prediction algorithm. The framework breaks down into modules so that
it can be more easily adapted for different applications. This chapter presents three
topics. The first describes the process that the framework executes in order to gen-
erate the labelled training data and train a failure prediction algorithm. The second
describes each module of the extended AFP framework. The final section details
extensions to the AFP framework explored by this research.
This chapter outlines the implementation and extensions to the AFP framework [2]
as well as an experiment that was conducted to validate those extensions and further
generalize the framework. The AFP framework was originally tested on a single
system running an operating system that has been deprecated. Consequently, the
results from the case study conducted using the AFP framework are limited in utility
and require generalization to be useful to the general community.
3.1 Failure Data Generation
This work extends the AFP framework [2] by presenting results after conduct-
ing another case study with an Microsoft (MS) Windows Server acting as an Active
Directory (AD) service with a more representative fault load as well as a new imple-
mentation of the General Software Fault Injection Technique (G-SWFIT) technique
for the x86-64 architecture.
The case study was done using three new types of faults: third-party memory leak,
third-party Central Processing Unit (CPU) hog, and process memory corruption. For
completeness, the standard G-SWFIT technique was also used. Another important
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modification was made in the actual data collected. The original case study used
status and machine state information polled every second. Salner et al. [1] points
out that this technique does not properly distinguish between underlying errors and
normal workload. In this case study, reported errors are used instead.
Finally, findings are reported after implementing this framework using two differ-
ent statistical machine learning techniques on reported errors (log messages): boosted
decision trees and the weighted Support Vector Machine (SVM). The weighted SVM
was used because of it performs well on imbalanced data and it is popular in the
Online Failure Prediction (OFP) community [1]. The boosted decision tree was used
because it is non-parametric, it is capable of classification, and it is particularly suited
for imbalanced data. In both cases, feature reduction was performed using the ap-
proach by Fulp et al. [12], of a restriction to a sliding time window. Irrera, et al. [21]
and Vaarandi [22] follow a similar approach.
This section outlines the step-by-step procedure by which the extended AFP
framework was evaluated to show how effective it is when used on Windows Server
deployments. This is done by dividing the steps taken in the experiment into the
three major phases as defined in [2]: preparation phase, execution phase, and train-
ing phase.
3.1.1 Preparation Phase.
In this phase the AFP framework is prepared to run for the first time as described
in [2]. The Cross Industry Standard Process for Data Mining (CRISP-DM) [23]
should be applied to this situation when evaluating how to best apply the AFP for
a particular target. For the purposes of this research, the focus was on the MS
Windows Directory Services and predicting failure in those services. To demonstrate
the efficacy of the AFP, a predictor was evaluated before and after a significant
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software update. As a result, the most critical preparation made in evaluating this
framework was to hold back all software updates on the target system prior to the
first run of the execution phase. The performance of various prediction techniques
was evaluated both before and after the Windows Update application was allowed to
run. A complete list of the updates installed is shown in Appendix C.
This phase is essentially comprised of the manual act of implementing the frame-
work. Each module of the implementation for this work is detailed in Section 3.2 and
is therefore not discussed further here.
3.1.2 Execution Phase.
A general outline of this phase is shown in Figure 7. This phase is divided into
three major steps: data collection and failure prediction, event checking, and train-
ing/update as described in this section.
3.1.2.1 Data Collection and Failure Prediction.
In this phase, the system has a working predictor providing input to some sort of
decision system. It should be noted here that this decision system does not have to be
automated. The system in this phase makes failure predictions about the current state
based on the last run of the training phase. This function was not implemented in this
research as it is application specific. The output of this process in this experiment
was a warning message indicating a predicted failure.
3.1.2.2 Event Checking.
Concurrent with the data collection and failure prediction sub-phase, the AFP
framework continuously monitors events that may alter the underlying system. The
output of each episode of this phase is a binary decision to either begin the training
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Figure 7. The flow of the major steps involved in the AFP framework execution
phase [2].
phase, or not. For this experiment, these events were software updates and the
training phase was manually triggered upon completion of these updates.
3.1.2.3 Failure Predictor (Re-)Training and Update.
The purpose of this sub-phase is to initiate the training phase and compare its
results (a new predictor) with the currently employed predictor. Should the new
predictor perform better, the old predictor is replaced by the new. In this experiment,
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this phase was accomplished manually.
3.1.3 Training Phase.
The training phase is broken down into five major steps: target replication, data
generation & collection, dataset building, predictor training, and analysis. The gen-
eral flow is shown in Figure 8. Each phase is outlined in the following sub-sections.
Figure 8. The flow of the major steps involved in the AFP framework training phase [2].
3.1.3.1 Target Replication.
During this phase a virtual clone of the target is made. After the clone is made, the
fault injection and monitoring software is installed. In this experiment, the monitoring
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tool was the same as was already installed on the production system so the extra step
of installing the monitoring software was unnecessary.
3.1.3.2 Data Generation & Collection.
The purpose of this phase is to generate the data to train a new prediction al-
gorithm. As a result, this sub-phase must be executed several times to generate
statistically meaningful datasets. In this phase, the controller triggers the cloned
target startup. Once startup is complete and the system enters an idle state, the
monitoring tool begins collecting data from the target. After monitoring has begun,
the workload is started. Once the workload has entered a steady state, the fault load
is started. Finally, when failure occurs, monitoring stops, the workload stops, and
the system is rebooted for the next run. To generate golden data (or data with no
failures present to aid training), the first run prevents the fault injection tool from
actually injecting faults. The golden runs help establish a baseline that includes the
execution of the fault injection tool.
The most critical part of this process is labelling the data when failure occurs.
For the purposes of this experiment, failure was defined by the log message ID 4625:
An account failed to log on1. When this occurred in conjunction with known valid
credentials on an enabled account, the preceding data window defined for the experi-
ment was labelled as failure prone. Additionally, the workload generator used in this
research reported when authentication failed and transmitted a syslog message to the
controller.
3.1.3.3 Dataset Building.
In this phase, the raw syslog messages are formatted and encoded to train the
prediction model. The purpose of this phase is to prepare the raw messages to be
1https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/977519
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used as numeric inputs for the training phase. Irrera, et al. [2] loaded all data into
a database for processing. In this work, the events were stored in a flat file on the
Ubuntu machine by the syslog server daemon. An example of one of these messages
is shown below:
May 8 14:31:52 dc.afnet.com MSWinEventLog 5 Security 3 Sun May 08 14:31:50 2016 4672 Microsoft-
Windows-Security-Auditing N/A Audit Success dc.afnet.com 12548 Special privileges assigned to new
logon. Subject: Security ID: S-1-5-21-2379403389-181978965-2953995107-500 Account Name:
Administrator Account Domain: AFNET Logon ID: 0x9beb4e7a Privileges: SeSecurityPrivilege
SeBackupPrivilege SeRestorePrivilege SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege SeDebugPrivilege
SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege SeLoadDriverPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege
SeEnableDelegationPrivilege
The messages were formatted using the Snare2 MSWinEventLog format which is
generally divided into several categories. The first is the time-stamp and host name of
the sender prepended by the syslog server daemon: May 8 14:31:52 dc.afnet.com. The
remainder of the message contains tab delimited values where the keys (and conse-
quent features) are shown in Table 1. Of these features, Criticality, EventLogSource,
EventID, SourceName, and CategoryString were selected for further encoding.
The raw messages were then encoded. First, the events were filtered by EventID as
is done by Fulp et al. [12] to reduce the noise generated by successful login attempts.
Log messages with IDs shown in Table 2 were filtered from the input.
Next, to encode the time dimension and reduce the sequential message ordering
dependency, a sliding time window was created by counting each unique entry for each
feature within the data window (∆td) as is done by Vaarandi [22]. During this stage,
the number of messages that were reported in the data window were also recorded
and used as a feature.
Finally, each time window preceding the failure within ∆tl was labelled as failure
prone as is done by Irrera, et al. [2]. This encoding enables the use of classification
algorithms in the training phase. An example of the final encoding is shown in Table 3.
2http://wiki.rsyslog.com/index.php/Snare_and_rsyslog
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Table 1. Typical authentication message sent as keys that correspond to the values as














CategoryString Special privileges assigned to. . .
ExtendedDataString Security ID: S-1-5-21-2379403. . .
Table 2. Microsoft log message IDs filtered from data collection3.
ID Message
4624 An account was successfully logged on.
4634 An account was logged off.
4672 Special privileges assigned to new logon.
4769 A Kerberos service ticket was requested.
4770 A Kerberos service ticket was renewed.
4776 The computer attempted to validate the credentials for an account.











The purpose of this phase is to use the data generated by the forced failure of
the virtual clone to train a machine learning algorithm to classify a system as failure
prone or not.
In this experiment, the execution phase was run k times. During this phase, each
of the k datasets produced by the k runs of the execution phase (each containing
a single failure), were used to train a statistical classification model. Each dataset
was an n× p matrix where n was the number of sliding time windows and p was the
number of predictors present in the output of the dataset building phase. These k
datasets were used to conduct a k − 1-fold cross validation training and evaluation
process where the first k − 2 datasets were used to train the statistical model. The
remaining set was used to validate the trained model. The data was then rotated
and the process was repeated k − 1 times. Parameters for the classification model
were selected based on the output of this cross validation. Finally, statistics and
performance on the final model’s performance on the held out data set were recorded.
3.1.3.5 Analysis.
During this phase, the precision, recall, f-measure, and area under the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve are computed using the figures measured in
the previous phase so that the new predictor can be compared against the old. If a
new predictor outperforms the old, the old is replaced with the new. Upon completion
of this phase, control flow returns to the Event Checking phase. In this phase, this
analysis was done manually.
3https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/977519
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3.2 Implementation of the AFP
3.2.1 AFP Framework Implementation.
This experiment replicated the experiment in [2] with the following modifications.
Most importantly, since the focus of this research is on reported errors, log messages
were used to train the predictor as is done in many other recent approaches [9, 10,
12, 16]. Instead of only using fault injection to induce failure, three additional fault
loads were explored. In addition to using the SVM model, boosted decision trees
were evaluated. Finally, in addition to the Apache web-server, the primary target
was the MS Windows Server running AD Domain Services. The purpose of Apache
web server was to validate the approach and additional fault loads. The original
AFP architecture is shown in Figure 9 with the parts that were modified in this work
highlighted.
3.2.2 AFP Modules.
Irrera, et al. [2] outline multiple modules into which they have broken the AFP
framework for organizational purposes. This research does not modify these modules,
instead, it takes a more granular approach and presents a modified architecture and
details each element of that architecture.
The following sections detail the virtual environment in which this architecture
was constructed. For reference, this virtual environment was hosted on two VMWare
ESXi 5.5 hypervisors each with two 2.6 Gigahertz (GHz) AMD Opteron 4180 (6 cores
each) CPUs and 64 Gigabyte (GB) memory. The specifications of the individual













Figure 9. The AFP framework implementation [2] with modified components high-
lighted.
Table 4. Hypervisor 1 configuration (sandbox/target).
Qty. Role Operating System CPU / Mem.
1 DC Win. Server 2008 R2 2 / 2 GB
1 Web Win. Server 2008 R2 2 / 2 GB
5 Client Win. 7 1 / 512 MB
Table 5. Hypervisor 2 configuration (controller).
Qty. Role Operating System CPU / Mem.
1 RDP Win. Server 2008 R2 1 / 4 GB
1 Log Ubuntu 14.04 LTS 1 / 1 GB
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3.2.3 Controller Hypervisor.
The controller responsibilities in this experiment were split between two systems
on a single hypervisor shown in Table 5. One system was the MS Windows Server
responsible for workload management and fault injection management. The other
system was an Ubuntu 14.04 server that performed the failure prediction management
and event management. Each of these functions is detailed in the following sections.
3.2.3.1 Failure Prediction.
The failure prediction module predicts failure using machine learning algorithms
trained using the labelled training data generated by the rest of this framework.
This module is constantly either training a new predictor because a software update
occurred, or predicting failure based on log messages and possibly other features
produced by the production system.
In the original case study, this module was implemented using an SVM prediction
model using the libsvm software library [2]. In this experiment, the statistical models
were trained on input built as described in Section 3.1.3.3 using the popular statistical
learning software suite R.
3.2.3.2 Fault Injection.
This module is responsible for managing the fault load used to create realistic
failure data. Irrera, et al. [2] use a single tool implementing the G-SWFIT for this
module and pointed out that this module is the most critical piece of the AFP imple-
mentation. G-SWFIT was developed by Duraes, et al. [3] to emulate software failures
for the purposes of software testing. The method is widely implemented for use in
software fault injection both commercially and academically [18, 24–26].
Recently, studies have questioned the representativeness of the failures generated
33
by G-SWFIT [20, 24]. In each case, the workload generated was critical in creat-
ing representative faults. This concern has been addressed in this research and is
discussed in Section 3.2.3.3.
An additional concern regarding fault injection has been that some injected faults
may not elude modern software testing and as a result never actually occur in produc-
tion software [25]. The recommended remedy is to conduct source code analysis to
determine which pieces of code get executed most frequently and avoid fault injection
in those areas. Unfortunately, the target of this research is not an open source project
and as a result, some of the faults and resulting failures may never happen in a pro-
duction environment. Fortunately, the fault injection tool that has been developed
for this research automatically scans each library loaded by the target executable for
fault injection points and then is capable of evenly distributing the faults it does
inject.
Because of the concerns with fault injection, the experiment conducted in this
research tested three additional types of fault load to more exhaustively represent
realistic faults that may be encountered by a target process. This experiment trained
a predictor using failures generated by third-party applications purposefully written
to slowly consume all available resources on the target systems. Specifically, the
third-party application contains a memory leak that slowly allocates all free system
memory until the target application crashes. Next, failures were recorded as the
result of a third-party application consuming all CPU time. Source code for this
application is included in Appendix B. Finally, failure was recorded after corrupting
heap space in memory (versus program memory as done by the G-SWFIT). This
type of fault could be caused by privileged third party applications such as hardware
drivers inadvertently writing to the target process’ allocated memory. Finally, for
completeness, this experiment uses a tool developed for this work that implements
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the G-SWFIT technique.
This work introduces an x86-64 implementation of G-SWFIT called Windows
Software Fault Injection Tool (W-SWFIT). The source code for W-SWFIT has been
published as open source on Github4 so that others may use it for any of the reasons
cited in the original G-SWFIT paper [3]. For completeness, the source is also included
in Appendix A.
For this research, the original plan was to use the same fault injection tool used
in the original case study by Irrera, et al. [2]. Unfortunately, that tool, and all
prior G-SWFIT implementations were incapable of injecting faults into x86-64 binary
executables. Further, many of the commercial products that were evaluated for this
research were incapable of dealing with modern Address Space Layout Randomization
(ASLR). As a result, W-SWFIT was developed for this research and is capable of
injecting faults into all user and kernel mode applications on modern MS Windows
operating systems.
The key contributions of W-SWFIT are ASLR adaption, and the x86-64 transla-
tions that have been performed. Further, as pointed out by Irrera, et al. [21], prior
implementations of the G-SWFIT were not capable of injecting faults into protected
(kernel mode) processes. Since the focus of this research is on a protected system
process, this capability was critical, and as a result, W-SWFIT made full use of the
WinAPI in a way that made protected process injection possible.
G-SWFIT works by scanning binary libraries already in memory for known pat-
terns (or operators). These operators are then mutated to match compiled errors that
could have been made during development. The errors targeted by G-SWFIT were
discovered by analyzing open source project bug reports and code repositories. The
errors were then classified based on the Orthogonal Defect Classification (ODC) [27]
4https://github.com/paullj1/w-swfit/
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and are shown in Table 6. The point of this mutation is that failure is ultimately
the result of developer error [1,2], and that fault injection accurately simulates those
errors [3]. Unfortunately, G-SWFIT has only previously been implemented for Java
applications [28, 29], and the IA32 instruction set [3, 25]. Furthermore, the target
applications in this research are strictly x86-64 (also known as x64 or amd64) ap-
plications, and the patterns identified previously are incompatible. Consequently, to
implement the AFP framework completely, a fault injection tool capable of mutating
x86-64 instructions in the same way was required. W-SWFIT implements two of the
operators from the original G-SWFIT shown in Table 6: OMFC and OMLPA. The
translation of these operators was not trivial given the complexity of the x86-64 archi-
tecture. However, a simple example of this translation is shown using the entry/exit
points of a function in Tables 7, and 8. The rest of the translations were done using
the Capstone 5 library and can be seen in source code for W-SWFIT.
In summary, for the purposes of this research, fault injection was performed
four ways: software fault injection with W-SWFIT, under-resourced memory, under-
resourced CPU, and heap space corruption. Apart from W-SWFIT, these new fault
loads are covered in more detail in Section 3.3.
5http://www.capstone-engine.org
Table 6. Fault operators used for fault injection [3].
Type Description ODC Classes
MIFS Missing “If (cond) { statement(s) }” Algorithm
MFC Missing function call Algorithm
MLAC Missing “AND EXPR” in expression used as branch Checking
MLPA Missing small and localized part of the algorithm Algorithm
WVAV Wrong value assigned to a value Assignment
MVI Missing variable initialization Assignment
MVAV Missing variable assignment using a value Assignment
WPFV Wrong variable used in parameter of function call Interface
36
Table 7. Function entry/exit patterns in IA32 bytecode [3].
Module Entry Point Module Exit Point
Instruction Explanation Instruction Explanation
push ebp stack frame move esp,ebp stack frame
mov ebp, esp setup pop ebp cleanup
sub esp, immed ret
Table 8. Function entry/exit patterns in x86-64 bytecode [3].
Module Entry Point Module Exit Point
Instruction Explanation Instruction Explanation
push rbp stack frame add rsp, immed stack frame
sub rsp, immed pop rbp cleanup
mov rbp, rdx setup ret
3.2.3.3 Workload Management.
The workload management module controls the generation of computational load
by directing the sandbox workload module to create realistic work for the virtually
cloned target to accomplish. Without this module, it could take too long for an
injected fault to evolve into a failure. Consider a missing free statement and the
consequent memory leak. A production target server may have a large amount of
available memory and the leak could be relatively small. To accelerate the possibility
of failure occurring, realistic load must be generated against the sandbox clone of the
production target.
In the original AFP case study, a Windows XP based web-server was the target
and the load generation management was collocated with the actual load genera-
tor - a simple web request generator [2]. In this experiment, the management and
actual load generator roles have been divided and a new tool has been developed:
Distributed PowerShell Load Generator (D-PLG). The rest of this section outlines
D-PLG and how it fulfills the workload and workload management functions of the
AFP framework.
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Realistic workload is critical in generating realistic failure and consequently train-
ing a useful predictor. Initial searches for a load generator suitable for this research
yielded a tool developed by MS that initiated Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) con-
nections to aid in sizing a terminal services server6. By executing an RDP session,
the authentication and Domain Name System (DNS) functions of the Domain Con-
troller (DC) would also be loaded. Unfortunately, this tool is no longer maintained
and would not execute on the target machine7. Further searches for tools that would
sufficiently load the DC did not produce any results necessitating the development of
D-PLG.
D-PLG is a collection of remotely executed MS PowerShell scripts managed by
a central script designed to generate realistic traffic that will sufficiently load MS
enterprise services including a web server and DC. Other network traffic generators
typically work by replaying traffic captured on a live network [30]. This would likely
work against an unsecured web server, but unfortunately, due to the cryptographic
nature of authentication on a DC, simply replaying traffic will not load such a service
since the timestamps and challenge responses will no longer be valid. As a result, any
replayed traffic will be dropped and ignored by a live DC. D-PLG solves this prob-
lem by making native authentication requests by use of built-in PowerShell cmdlets
(pronounced command-lets). By doing this, realistic authentication requests are sent
to a DC and are actually processed. Finally, the DNS role can be stressed by sending
the authentication requests using domain names without allowing local caching.
By use of native cmdlets, D-PLG is capable of generating four kinds of traffic
designed to stress the following services: authentication, web, DNS, mail, file sharing,





an effort to make the traffic as real as possible. After building the tool, an experiment
was constructed and executed on a scale model of a production environment. The
scaled simulation network was built using the recommendations of the MS community
for sizing a DC [31] and tested by running the tool on five client machines against the
DC for five rounds of five minutes. The results of this test are shown in Figures 10,
11, 12.
D-PLG makes use of client machines running a Windows operating system with
PowerShell version 4.0 or newer. The controller asks each machine to generate a
configurable list of requests at evenly spaced intervals for a configurable duration of
time. While this may not be realistic network traffic, it does produce realistic load
against a DC. Since D-PLG depends on the use of client machines, it is recommended
that any load generation be conducted during off-peak hours if spare client sized ma-
chines are not available. It should be noted however, that even with poorly resourced
client machines (shown in Table 4), D-PLG was able to generate fifteen thousand
authentication sessions over a five minute period; approximately 10 authentication
sessions per machine, per second. With modern workstations, the impact on these
client machines is negligible and they can be in use during load generation.
Based on these results, and that a production DC should be at approximately
40% CPU utilization during peak usage [31], D-PLG is capable of sufficiently loading
the DC over a sustained period of time for the purposes of implementing the AFP
framework and was used in this research. Further, D-PLG is capable of scaling to
provide load against higher capacity DCs by using only a few client machines. D-PLG
is available on Github8 for others to use.
In this experiment, D-PLG was used as the central workload manager. Further-
more, the client portion of D-PLG was used installed on five client machines and used
8https://github.com/paullj1/AFP-DC/tree/master/D-PLG
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Figure 10. How many packets per second were sent or received by the domain controller
across all five rounds of the first test. In each test, we captured approximately 1.8
million packets.
Figure 11. How many packets per second were sent or received by one of the clients
across all five rounds of the first test.
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Figure 12. Domain controller CPU and memory utilization during the first test.
as the sandbox workload generator as discussed in Section 3.2.4.3.
3.2.3.4 Events Manager.
This module is responsible for receiving and managing log messages and other
events that may be used to train the failure prediction algorithm. Irrera, et al. [2]
use the MS Logman tool from the remote controller for event management in their
original case study. Logman was configured to poll 170 system variables on the target
machine once per second.
Since the focus of this research is on reported errors, and the experimental envi-
ronment in this work was modelled after modern enterprise environments where this
sort of polling could produce too much data, this experiment implemented an rsyslog
server daemon and the target was configured to forward logs to it. Moreover, because
syslog is a standard protocol, it is already in use in many enterprise networks today.
The messages forwarded to the events manager were then processed and added to a
Structured Query Language (SQL) database for training and prediction.
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3.2.3.5 Sandbox Management.
The purpose of the sandbox management module is to supervise the virtual cloning
of the production system that is made when a new predictor is to be trained. As
Irrera, et al. [2, 17] point out, it is typically inappropriate to inject faults and cause
failures in production systems, so a virtual clone must be created for that purpose.
Furthermore, the virtualization of the target process has little affect on generated
data [17].
For this experiment, the sandbox was managed manually using VM snapshots.
After an initial stable state was configured, snapshots of every component of the ar-
chitecture were taken so that they could be reset after iterations of the experiment.
It is important to note here that because VMWare has documented Application Pro-
gramming Interface (API)s, in future work, this function could be automated.
3.2.4 Sandbox Hypervisor.
The sandbox hypervisor hosts the virtual clone of the production environment
where faults are injected and from which failure data is collected. Cloning the pro-
duction environment ensures that the production system is not be affected and service
are maintained during the training phase. For the purposes of this experiment, the
sandbox was constructed on a single hypervisor implemented as shown in Table 4.
The following sections outline each module within this module.
3.2.4.1 Fault Injection.
This module is responsible for causing the target application to fail so that labelled
failure data can be generated in a short period of time. As described in Section 3.2.3.2,
W-SWFIT has been developed to serve this purpose and implements the G-SWFIT
technique developed by Duraes, et al. [3] for fault injection. The execution is con-
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trolled by the Windows Server VM on the ‘Controller’ hypervisor through PowerShell
remote execution to reduce the interaction and potential to introduce bias into the
training data. The tool allowed us to inject a comprehensive list of faults into the
AD services processes and binary libraries which are mostly contained within the
‘lsass.exe’ process. Since many of the critical functions performed by the AD services
processes are performed in one library called ‘ntdsa.dll’9, it was the focus of fault
injection.
This function was extended by this research to include failure as a result of third-
party memory and CPU leaks, and memory corruption. Section 3.3 covers these
extensions in more depth.
3.2.4.2 Monitoring.
The purpose of this module is to capture some evidence or indication of pending
failure at the target host level so that it may be used to train a statistical prediction
model. Since Irrera, et al. [2] use the Logman remotely, no additional software was
needed on the host. In this experiment, syslog was used and while it is a recognized
standard, syslog messages are not produced natively in Windows. Fortunately, several
forwarding agents are available to translate and forward native Windows log messages
to a syslog server. For this experiment, the Solar Winds syslog forwarding tool was
used because of its popularity in the security community and existing presence on
many enterprise networks. The tool is a lightweight application that simply forwards
Windows events to a syslog server.
3.2.4.3 Sandbox Workload.
The purpose of this module is to create realistic work for the target application
to do before faults are injected. If the workload is not realistic, then the failures that
9https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc780455(v=ws.10).aspx
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occur after fault injection will not be representative of real failures and any data or
indicators collected cannot be used to train an effective prediction algorithm [2,20,24].
Irrera, et al. [2] used a web traffic generator called TPC-W installed on a single
machine in their original study because their target was a web server. This would be
the ideal tool for the validation test on the Apache web server in this experiment but
unfortunately, this tool has been deprecated and no substitute has been written 10.
As a result, D-PLG was used as the work load generator for both the DC and web
requests.
D-PLG is a distributed tool and requires the use of client machines. This module
is represented by those client machines. In this experiment, the client portion of D-
PLG was installed on five client machines managed by the central workload manager
as discussed in Section 3.2.3.3.
3.2.5 Target Hypervisor.
The target hypervisor was constructed as a clone of the sandbox hypervisor shown
in Table 4. The following section outlines the monitoring tool installed on both the
DC and web server on this hypervisor.
3.2.5.1 Monitoring.
The monitoring module is exactly the same as the sandbox monitoring module
and for this experiment, the Solar Winds syslog forwarding tool was used. The only
modification worth noting here is that to ensure that the messages sent were uniquely
identified by the controller, the hostname of the target machine must be different from
the hostname of the sandbox target machine.
10http://www.tpc.org/tpcw/
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3.3 Extensions to the AFP
This section outlines the extensions to the AFP framework explored by this re-
search. Given that fault injection isn’t always considered representative [20], the next
three sub-sections outline three additional fault loads explored. Next, an outline of
the changes in how data was collected from the target is presented. Finally, this
chapter concludes with a brief summary of these extensions.
3.3.1 Under-Resourced CPU.
A CPU may become under-resourced in a few ways. The organization implement-
ing the target service may not accurately anticipate the amount of load the service
may experience. Alternatively, a third-party application installed on the same phys-
ical machine may inadvertently consume all CPU time. The result in both of these
situations is the target process gets starved of CPU time.
This condition was simulated in two ways to accurately capture both scenarios
outlined above. First, by downsizing the number of virtual CPUs available to the
target VM. Second, by introducing a third-party application that ran at 100% CPU.
The source code for this application is shown in Appendix B.
3.3.2 Under-Resourced Memory.
Available memory can be limited in a few ways. As with the under-resourced
CPU, the implementing organization may underestimate the amount of memory that
will be needed by a server to handle the required demand. Additionally, a third-party
application could contain a memory leak. In both cases, the target application may
not have enough memory to accomplish the work it has been assigned.
To test this fault load, this experiment created both conditions outlined above.
First, as was done for the CPU, the amount of memory available to the target VM
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was reduced. Second, a third-party application with an intentional memory leak
was run on the target system. The source code for this application is also shown in
Appendix B.
3.3.3 Heap Space Corruption.
Finally, heap-space corruption can happen in a production environment in a few
ways. First, in the Windows operating system, device drivers share critical kernel
mode libraries and have elevated permissions [32]. If a hardware device driver devel-
oper inadvertently writes to an area of memory not allocated for his software, say by
forgetting to dereference a pointer, Windows may not warn him. Consequently, he
may corrupt the memory of another process.
In this experiment, the focus of this fault load was on the user database. First,
users that had been cached by the DC process were corrupted. Next, to simulate a
disk failure, the same user was corrupted on disk. To do this, the W-SWFIT code
was modified to be able to search and write anywhere in a processes memory. This
code is shown in Appendix A.
3.3.4 Reported Errors.
Finally, this research focusses on reported errors instead of system information
using the Logman tool in the original study [2]. As pointed out by Salfner, et al. [1],
a predictor only given system information is not typically able to determine the
difference between a system that is going to fail and one that is perhaps under higher
than average load. It may be able to pick up on undetected errors, but there is
little to distinguish those from every day use. Consider the DC and a memory leak
situation. According to Russinovich, et al. [32], the MS DC will use as much memory
as is available to cache user credentials. This consumption of all available memory
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may appear very similar to a memory leak if system information is all that is being
recorded.
3.3.5 Summary.
In summary, by adding these additional faults and considering reported errors
when generating failure data used to train a prediction algorithm, the resulting algo-
rithm will be able to predict a wider range of realistic failures.
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IV. Experimental Results and Analysis
To test the extended Adaptive Failure Prediction (AFP) framework laid out in
Chapter III, failure data was generated before a series of major software updates
using software fault injection, under-resourced Central Processing Unit (CPU), under-
resourced memory, and heap space corruption, on two Windows Server 2008 machines:
the Domain Controller (DC), and the Apache web server. The failure data was used to
train two statistical prediction models: an Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier,
and a boosted decision tree. Following the software updates, more failure data was
generated and the old statistical models were used to predict failure in the new data.
Finally, new statistical models were trained using the new data. To compare each
fault load both before and after the software updates, performance was measured
using the Area Under the Curve (AUC) and F-Measure.
In this chapter, common reporting techniques and measures of performance are
reviewed. These measures and reporting techniques are then used to report the results
of the experiments conducted. The chapter concludes with a short summary.
4.1 Performance Measures
This section reviews the performance measures used in this chapter to demonstrate
the efficacy and quality of the statistical models trained in this research. These
measures are commonly used in the field of machine learning to compare and assess
predictors and are taken from a survey of Online Failure Prediction (OFP) methods
written by Salfner et al. [1].
This research utilizes a technique called cross-validation in which a set of labelled
data are broken into three parts as follows:
1. Training Set: A data set that allows a prediction model to establish and optimize
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its parameters
2. Validation Set: The parameters selected in the training phase are then validated
against a separate data set
3. Test Set: The predictor is finally run against a final previously unevaluated
data set to assess generalizability
During the test phase, true positives (negatives) versus false positives (negatives)
are determined in order to compute the performance measures in this section. The
following terms and associated abbreviations are used: True Positive (TP) is when
failure has been predicted and then actually occurs; False Positive (FP) is when failure
has been predicted and then does not occur; True Negative (TN) is when a state has
been accurately classified as non-failure prone; False Negative (FN) is when a state
has been classified as non-failure prone and a failure occurs.
4.1.1 Precision and Recall.
Precision and recall are the most popular performance measures used when for
comparing OFP approaches. The two are related and often times improving precision
results in reduced recall. Precision is the number of correctly identified failures over
the number of all predicted failures. In other words, it reports how many were correct
out of all of the predictions of a failure-prone state that were made. In general, higher





Recall is the ratio of correctly predicted failures to the number of true failures.
In other words, it reports, out of the actual failures that occurred, how many the
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predictor classified as failure-prone. In conjunction with a higher precision, higher





F-Measure is the harmonic mean of precision and recall and represents a trade-
off between the two [33]. A higher F-Measure reflects a higher quality predictor.
F-Measure is expressed as:
F -Measure =
2 · Precision ·Recall
Precision+Recall
∈ [0, 1]
4.1.2 False Positive Rate (FPR) and Specificity.
Precision and recall do not account for true negatives (correctly predicted non-
failure-prone situations) which can bias an assessment of a predictor. The following
performance measures take true negatives into account to help evaluators more accu-
rately assess and compare predictors.
FPR is the number of incorrectly predicted failures over the total number of
predicted non-failure-prone states. A smaller FPR reflects a higher quality predictor.





Specificity the number of times a predictor correctly classified a state as non-
failure-prone over all non-failure-prone predictions made. In general, specificity alone






4.1.3 Negative Predictive Value (NPV) and Accuracy.
In some cases, it may be desirable to show that a prediction approach can correctly
classify non-failure-prone situations. The following performance measures usually can
not stand alone due to the nature of failures being rare events. In other words, a highly
“accurate” predictor could classify a state 100% of the time as non-failure-prone and
still fail to predict every single true failure. This predictor would be highly accurate,
but ultimately ineffective.
NPV is the number of times a predictor correctly classifies a state as non-failure-
prone to the total number all non-failure-prone states during which a prediction was




Accuracy is the ratio of all correct predictions to the number of predictions made.
Accuracy is expressed as:
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FP + FN + TN
4.1.4 Precision/Recall Curve.
Much like with other predictors, many OFP approaches implement variable thresh-
olds to sacrifice precision for recall or vice versa. That trade-off is typically visualized
using a precision/recall curve as shown in Figure 13.
Another popular visualization is the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
curve. By plotting True Positive Rate (TPR) over FPR one is able to see the pre-
dictors ability to accurately classify a failure. A sample ROC curve is shown in
Figure 14.
The ROC curve relationship can be further illustrated by calculating the AUC.
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Figure 13. Sample precision/recall curves [1]. Curve A represents a poorly performing
predictor, curve B an average predictor, and curve C an exceptional predictor.
Figure 14. ROC plots of perfect, average, and random predictors [1].
52




TPR(FPR) dFPR ∈ [0, 1]
.
A purely random predictor will result in an AUC of 0.5 and a perfect predictor
a value of 1. The AUC can be thought of as the probability that a predictor will be
able to accurately distinguish between a failure-prone state and a non-failure-prone
state, over the entire operating range of the predictor.
The results of the experiments conducted in this research report all of the above
described measures of performance in the next section.
4.2 Results
The experiments designed in Chapter III were executed in a virtual environment to
produce failure data. The failure data generated was used to train statistical learning
models using the open source statistical learning software suite: R. The parameters
used to train each model were selected using cross-validation on a subset of the failures
generated. Finally, each model was evaluated using a held-out test set. The results
of this evaluation for each fault load are reported here.
The rest of this chapter is organized first by the target system, then by the different
fault loads that were used to generate failure data on the corresponding target. In
each sub-section, the results after training a machine learning model on failure data
generated using that type of fault are detailed. Finally, this chapter is concluded with
a summary of these results.
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4.2.1 Microsoft (MS) DC.
4.2.1.1 Fault Injection.
This fault load was effective at creating a failure, but unfortunately, each failure
observed occurred immediately after introducing the fault. Because there was no
delay between injection and failure, there did not exist any indicators of failure. Con-
sequently, machine learning cannot help in this situation. According to Russinovich,
et al. [32] the lsass.exe process, as well as other critical system processes, are at the
top of the structured exception handling stack and do not handle exceptions. When
faced with exceptions, the processes exit and the system reboots.
4.2.1.2 Under-Resourced CPU.
This fault load never resulted in failure. To test this fault load, the virtual domain
controllers resources were reduced. The CPU went from a dual-core to a single virtual
CPU, and the memory was reduced from 2 Gb to 512 Mb. This reduction was
well beneath the recommended capacity [31] for a domain controller. The workload
generator was then allowed to run against this configuration for seven days. For the
duration of the test, the CPU load was 100%, and physical memory was 90% utilized
on average. While the service did experience reduced response time, failure did not
occur.
Another test was conducted to test this fault load by allowing a third-party appli-
cation to slowly consume all CPU time. Much like the previous test, this test never
resulted in failure. Consequently, the learning was not attempted for fault load.
4.2.1.3 Under-Resourced Memory.
The under-resourced memory fault load was the first that created observable in-
dicators of failure with any lead time. This fault load produced the best performing
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predictors and the largest sliding time window for prediction of sixty seconds. Accord-
ing to James, et al. [34], there can be advantages and trade-offs between parametric
and non-parametric models. For this reason, this experiment explores the use of two
machine learning models: the weighted SVM, and boosted decision trees using the
multinomial distribution.
4.2.1.4 Weighted SVM.
For this prediction method, the e1071 package was used to train an SVM. The
tune function was used to run a 5-fold cross-validation a total of 48 times to select the
optimal parameters (gamma, cost, and degree polynomial) using: four kernels, four
sliding data/prediction windows, and three training/test data splits. The classifica-
tion weights were set to roughly equal the proportion of failure prone to non-failure
prone data windows 0.8 for failure, and 0.2 for non-failure.
The optimal model was selected with the Radial kernel with γ = 0.1, cost = 1,
time window = 60 seconds, and the split of data = 4 of the observed failures used for
training.
Initial test performance was poor so the test data was then evaluated in sequential
order using a threshold. After two sequential windows were predicted as failure-prone,
the next w windows were also predicted as failure-prone, where w = window size −
threshold size. For threshold = 2, the resulting confusion matrix for the optimal F-
Measure, the ROC curve, and the precision/recall curve are shown in Table 9, and
Figure 15 respectively.
Table 9. Confusion matrix on test data created before software updates on threshold







(a) Precision/Recall Curve. (b) ROC Curve (AUC = 0.8664).
Figure 15. Test data performance of the SVM prediction method on failure data
obtained by consuming all available memory until target application fails.
After the software update, the same model was used on a new set of generated
failures. The old model did not accurately classify a single failure prone time window.
A new model was then trained with the newly generated failure data. Unfortunately,
after this software update, with all other things held constant, the weighted SVM
model was unable to achieve the same level of performance as before resulting in a
maximum F-Measure of 0.4380 indicating the predicted underlying system changes.
4.2.1.5 Boosted Decision Trees.
For this prediction model, the gbm package was used to train a boosted decision
tree. Cross-validation was used to select λ = 0.03, the interaction depth of = 4,
and the number of trees = 1000. The multinomial distribution was used to perform
classification. This was chosen instead of Bernoulli given that the two distributions are
the same except multinomial is capable of classification with more than two classes.
While this flexibility is not required for this experiment, it may be useful in the future
to predict additional system states like ‘degraded’, or ‘idle’.
The precision/recall, and ROC curves on a sixty second data/prediction window
are shown in Figure 16. The confusion matrix at the optimal threshold for F-measure
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is shown in Table 10.
After the software update, the same prediction model was used new set of gen-
erated failures. A list of updates that were applied are shown in Appendix C. The
precision/recall and ROC curves on data generated after the software update using
the old model are shown in Figure 17. The confusion matrix at the optimal threshold
for F-measure is shown in Table 10.
Finally, a new predictor was trained using more generated failures as was done
before the update. The precision/recall, and ROC curves on the held-out test data are
shown in Figure 18 and the confusion matrix at the optimal threshold for F-measure
is shown in Table 12.
4.2.1.6 Heap Space Corruption.
Just as with fault injection, this fault load was able to produce failures, but these
failures were not preceded by any indicators. To increase realism in this fault load, the
focus of the corruption was on the user database. The user database is incrementally
cached as authentication requests are received [32]. To test this fault load, the AFP
execution phase was run as normal. After the workload generator reached a steady
state, a single user in the database on disk was corrupted followed immediately by the
same user being corrupted in process memory. If the disk was not corrupted along with
memory, the process would have treated the corruption as a cache miss and re-cached
the user from disk. When both were corrupted simultaneously, the process crashed
and forced system reboot the very next time that user requested authentication.
Table 10. Confusion matrix on test data created before software updates on threshold







(a) Precision/Recall Curve. (b) ROC Curve (AUC = 0.9984).
Figure 16. Test data performance of the boosting prediction method on failure data
obtained by consuming all available memory until target application fails.
(a) Precision/Recall Curve. (b) ROC Curve (AUC = 0.4854).
Figure 17. Performance of the boosting prediction method trained on failure data
created before the software update obtained by consuming all available memory until
target application fails.
Table 11. Post-update failure data confusion matrix on threshold with highest F-






Table 12. Post-update failure data confusion matrix on threshold with highest F-







(a) Precision/Recall Curve. (b) ROC Curve (AUC = 0.9801).
Figure 18. Performance of the boosting prediction method trained on failure data
created after the software update obtained by consuming all available memory until
target application fails.
Unfortunately, exactly as with fault injection, there were no preceding indicators of
failure and thus training a prediction model was unsuccessful.
4.2.2 Web Server.
To validate the approach and implementation of the AFP framework in this ex-
periment, it was also tested against an Apache web server. The underlying system
change in this experiment was simulated by upgrading Apache from version 2.2.31
x64 to version 2.4.20 x64. Results for the web server were almost identical to those
for the DC for each fault load. The only predictable failure was in the case of the
memory leak. The following sub-sections outline specific results after testing each
fault load.
4.2.2.1 Fault Injection.
In the case of the web server, each library loaded by the Apache server process
httpd.exe was targeted for fault injection. In every case, faults were injected until
failure occurred. Much like the DC, for each failure observed, no preceding indications
of failure were visible in the log messages.
59
4.2.2.2 Under-Resourced CPU.
Much like with the DC, both methods of creating this situation resulted in no fail-
ure. The client machines did experience delayed responses, but the server continued
to run.
4.2.2.3 Under-Resourced Memory.
As with the DC, this was the only fault load that could be used to predict failure
given only reported errors. However, machine learning was not necessary given the
low number of log messages produced. Since Apache stores access requests in a
separate file, they were essentially pre-filtered. Apache, also by default, stores error
messages in an external log. There were no messages reported in this file in any of
the failure runs conducted. The only indicators produced were reported by Windows
and recorded by the rsyslog server. An average number of 15 messages were reported
during each round of the execution phase and the indicators of failure were easy to
see. In this case, simple rules could be used to predict failure in this process so a
learning algorithm was not trained.
After the Apache software update was applied, the indicators of failure did not
change and there were no additional messages reported in the separate error log. For
this reason, the same updates were applied to the operating system as was done for
the DC target. After these updates, the indicators changed slightly but were still
very few and could be used to write a few simple rules.
These results do not diminish the utility of the AFP framework. Without the
framework, the indicators would still be unknown until after a failure. Moreover,
there would be no way to tell how long a set of rules would be effective after being
written.
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4.2.2.4 Heap Space Corruption.
This fault load was tested against the Apache server by targeting the actual web
page stored in memory. Much like was done by the DC with users, this was treated
as a cache miss and the content was retrieved from disk. Again, to simulate a disk
failure, this file was made inaccessible. The result was an immediate failure to serve
the content. As with the DC, there were no preceding indications of failure.
4.2.3 Summary.
In summary, the only fault load usable for training a statistical model to predict
failure based only on reported errors was the memory leak. As expected, the software
update did drastically reduce the effectiveness of a model trained with failure data
before the software update. The boosted decision tree was able to be re-trained after
the software update, but the SVM was not. This suggests that both models should be
used to ensure the AFP framework is able to adapt to the underlying system changes
and maintain at least one useful predictor.
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V. Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter outlines several lines of future work based on the outcomes of this
research. The future work is then followed by the conclusions drawn from this work
and a discussion of their impact.
5.1 Future Work
Several lines of research following this work are presented in this section. First
and foremost, in order to put this technique into use on production systems, the proof
of concept Windows Software Fault Injection Tool (W-SWFIT) application must be
completed. Furthermore, while automation was a consideration while conducting this
research, it was not implemented. To be effective in a production environment, the
entire Adaptive Failure Prediction (AFP) process must be automated.
One especially relevant and interesting line of effort that should follow this work
is to better identify when the underlying system has changed enough to require re-
training. While the process is automated, it will unlikely be necessary after every
software update. In order to avoid unnecessary use of resources, this process could
be explored.
As was demonstrated with the boosted decision trees, other statistical classifiers
could be explored. The AFP framework is not limited to a single predictor [2]. A series
of prediction models can be used to vote on the state of a system, the output being the
majority. In addition to exploring other statistical learning models, additional states
(or classes) could be explored. For example, instead of a failure state, a classification
model could be used to predict when a system would be idle to know when best to
install software updates. Further, a classification model may be able to automate
the classification and prediction of when a target was under a malicious attack in a
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method similar to the AFP framework.
An additional area of exploration should be to better identify how fault injection
actually affects the underlying system. This research has shown that in some cases, it
can be extremely difficult to identify areas that will create realistic failure conditions
with any preceding indicators. Even when constrained, a single library can have
hundreds of injection points. Furthermore, in some cases, even when all injection
points are tested, none may lead to a realistic failure. For this reason, the additional
fault loads play an integral role.
The use of additional system statistics in conjunction with reported errors could
be explored but as Salfner, et al. [1] point out, it is difficult to distinguish between
normal operations or increased work load using this type of information. In this work,
the only possible outcomes of fault injection were fail immediately, or no fail. For
this reasons, the use of this data was not explored.
Finally, the integration of actual failure data with the AFP framework should be
explored. Bootstrapping could be used to better integrate actual failure data into the
training phase if it is observed.
5.2 Conclusion
This research explored the use of the AFP framework with additional fault loads
to predict failure using reported errors in the Microsoft (MS) Domain Controller
(DC). It has been shown that it is possible to predict failure in modern MS enterprise
authentication architecture given a representative fault load. Unfortunately, at the
time of writing, two out of the three fault loads introduced in this research did not
create failure conditions that could be predicted due to the fact that there were no
preceding indicators of failure. This was a stated limitation of the research. However,
the new fault loads are not useless. As was demonstrated with the Support Vector
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Machine (SVM) predictor, the underlying system changes can introduce or eliminate
an application’s vulnerability to certain types of faults. For this reason, if the AFP
framework is implemented on MS DCs, all fault loads should be used in the execution
and training phases.
Perhaps most interestingly, fault injection, as was used in the original AFP frame-
work implementation, had two outcomes: no failure occurred or failure occurred im-
mediately. In the controlled virtual environment, failure was predictable using polled
system health information, but perhaps the indicators used to predict the failure were
not actual errors but the fault injection tool itself injecting faults. Since during the
golden runs, the fault injection tool never wrote to another process’ memory, it is
possible that a predictor trained using system health information would associate
these operations with failure. Furthermore, even only using the Operator for Missing
Function Call (OMFC), there were still thousands of injection points in the Windows
Server 2008 operating system. Identifying the handful that may activate in a realistic
way without crashing the target service immediately is not trivial. One potential
solution to this problem is to implement some sort of taint engine as is being used
in software testing. Being able to more accurately identify where in the course of
a programs execution a register will be accessed could lead to more accurate fault
injection. Clearly more work must be done to validate using fault injection alone in
the AFP framework.
In addition to the new fault loads introduced in this work, a load generator has
also been presented: Distributed PowerShell Load Generator (D-PLG), capable of
sufficiently simulating peak usage of a MS enterprise DC. Additional uses for D-
PLG outside of use in the AFP framework include capacity planning/sizing, network
security testing and auditing, and software testing. This research also introduced
W-SWFIT which can be used to perform fault injection for a variety of additional
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uses like software testing and auditing.
As mentioned, a limitation of this technique is that it is not able to predict mali-
cious acts or Act of God events. Furthermore, the data generated are still simulated
data and as such, may not completely capture all possible failure events. The AFP
framework as presented here will however provide more reliable predictions than are
currently available today.
In conclusion, the modified AFP framework as presented here can be used to effec-
tively predict failures that might occur in a production environment and is capable of
adapting to underlying system changes using only reported errors. For these reasons,
it is recommended that if the AFP framework is to be implemented as laid out in
this research, all fault loads should be integrated to maximize the frameworks ability
to adapt to system changes. To improve the efficacy of a predictor trained using this
generated data, real failure data and additional predictors can easily be integrated if
available. Finally, real failure data is difficult to obtain given how rare failure is in
modern systems. Unfortunately, even after it is obtained, it can rapidly become dep-
recated by underlying system changes. Using the AFP with the fault loads introduced
in this work to generate simulated failure data is the next best thing to having real
data and provides more useful predictions than are available with no failure data.
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Appendix A. Windows Software Fault Injection Tool
(W-SWFIT) Source Code









char* GetAddressOfData(HANDLE process, const char *data, size_t len);
int _tmain(int argc, _TCHAR* argv[]) {
// Declarations
DWORD aProcesses[1024], cbNeeded, cProcesses;
TCHAR szProcessName[MAX_PATH] = TEXT("<unknown>");
unsigned int i;
// Get All pids
if (!EnumProcesses(aProcesses, sizeof(aProcesses), &cbNeeded)){
cerr << "Failed to get all PIDs: " << GetLastError() << endl;
return -1;
}
// Get screen width
CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE), &csbi);
int dwidth = csbi.srWindow.Right - csbi.srWindow.Left;
cout << "Running Processes" << endl;
printf("%-6s %-*s\n", "PID", dwidth - 7, "Process");
cout << string(3, ’-’) << " " << string(dwidth - 7, ’-’) << endl;
cProcesses = cbNeeded / sizeof(DWORD);
for (i = 0; i < cProcesses; i++) {
if (aProcesses[i] != 0) {
HANDLE hProc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION | PROCESS_VM_READ, FALSE,
aProcesses[i]);
if (hProc != NULL) {
HMODULE hMod;
DWORD cbNeededMod;
if (EnumProcessModules(hProc, &hMod, sizeof(hMod), &cbNeededMod)) {
GetModuleBaseName(hProc, hMod, szProcessName, sizeof(szProcessName
) / sizeof(TCHAR));
}






string s_pid = "";
cout << endl << "Into which process would you like to inject faults? [PID]: ";
getline(cin, s_pid);
int pid = stoi(s_pid);
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HANDLE hTarget = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, pid);
if (!hTarget) {
cerr << "Failed to open process (check your privilege): " << GetLastError() << endl;
return -1;
}
// Fault Injection or Memory Corruptions?
string s_fivsmc = "";
cout << endl << "Would you like to inject Faults, or corrupt Memory? [f|m]: ";
getline(cin, s_fivsmc);
if (s_fivsmc.find("m") != string::npos){
string s_query = "";
cout << endl << "What are you looking for in process memory?: ";
getline(cin, s_query);
char* ret = GetAddressOfData(hTarget, s_query.c_str(), s_query.length());
if (ret) {
cout << "Found at addr: " << (void*)ret << endl;
size_t bytesRead;
size_t sizeToRead = s_query.size();
char *buf = (char *)malloc(sizeToRead + 1);
ReadProcessMemory(hTarget, ret, buf, sizeToRead, &bytesRead);
buf[sizeToRead] = ’\0’;
cout << "Num bytes read: " << bytesRead << endl;
cout << "Contents: " << string(buf) << endl;
// Overwrite it
byte *null_array = (byte *)malloc(bytesRead);
fill_n(null_array, bytesRead, 0x00);
SIZE_T mem_bytes_written = 0;
if (WriteProcessMemory(hTarget, (LPVOID)ret, null_array, bytesRead, &
mem_bytes_written) != 0) {
cout << "Bytes written: " << mem_bytes_written << endl;
cout << "Successful corruption." << endl;
return 0;
} else {








// Enumerate modules within process
HMODULE hmods[1024];
cout << "DLLs currently loaded in target process:" << endl;
printf("%-4s %-*s\n", "ID", dwidth-5, "Module Name:");
cout << string(4, ’-’) << " " << string(dwidth - 5, ’-’) << endl;
if (EnumProcessModules(hTarget, hmods, sizeof(hmods), &cbNeeded)) {
for (i = 0; i < (cbNeeded / sizeof(HMODULE)); i++) {
TCHAR szModName[MAX_PATH];
if (GetModuleFileNameEx(hTarget, hmods[i], szModName, sizeof(szModName) / sizeof
(TCHAR))) {
_tprintf(TEXT("%4d %-*s\n"), i, dwidth-5, szModName);
} else {





cerr << "Failed to enum the modules: " << GetLastError() << endl;
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}// Which Module?
string s_mod_id = "";
cout << "Into which module would you like to inject faults? [ID]: ";
getline(cin, s_mod_id);
int mod_id = stoi(s_mod_id);
MODULEINFO lModInfo = { 0 };
cout << "Dll Information:" << endl;
if (GetModuleInformation(hTarget, hmods[mod_id], &lModInfo, sizeof(lModInfo))){
cout << "\t Base Addr: " << lModInfo.lpBaseOfDll << endl;
cout << "\t Entry Point: " << lModInfo.EntryPoint << endl;
cout << "\t Size of image: " << lModInfo.SizeOfImage << endl << endl;
} else {
cerr << "Failed to get module information: " << GetLastError() << endl;
return -1;
}
// Get module name
TCHAR szModName[MAX_PATH] = TEXT("<unknown>");
GetModuleFileNameEx(hTarget, hmods[mod_id], szModName, sizeof(szModName) / sizeof(TCHAR));
// Build library object
Library *library = new Library(hTarget, (DWORD64)lModInfo.lpBaseOfDll,
lModInfo.SizeOfImage, string((char *)
&szModName));
// Save library for future static analysis
library->write_library_to_disk("C:\\memdump.dll");
library->inject();






int iResult = WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2, 2), &wsaData);
if (iResult != NO_ERROR) {




ConnectSocket = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (ConnectSocket == INVALID_SOCKET) {








iResult = connect(ConnectSocket, (SOCKADDR *)&clientService, sizeof(clientService));
if (iResult == SOCKET_ERROR) {






char *sendbuf = "FAULT_INJECTED_SUCCESSFULLY";
iResult = send(ConnectSocket, sendbuf, (int)strlen(sendbuf), 0);
if (iResult == SOCKET_ERROR) {















char* p = 0;
while(p < si.lpMaximumApplicationAddress) {




if(ReadProcessMemory(process, p, &chunk[0], info.RegionSize, &bytesRead))
for(size_t i = 0; i < (bytesRead - len); ++i)
if(memcmp(data, &chunk[i], len) == 0)





















map < DWORD64, Operator *> local_injection_points; // Address -> NOP Sequence
DWORD64 start_addr = 0;
DWORD64 end_addr = 0;
byte *buf;
DWORD64 size = 0;
HANDLE hTarget; // Managed by Library (don’t close it here)
// Capstone Buffer
cs_insn *code_buf;




bool inject(Operator *op, DWORD64 addr);























string name; // Name of library
vector < Function * > functions; // Vector (list) of functions in library
map < Operator *, Operator * > function_patterns; // Vector of function patterns
byte *buf; // Buffer for memory contents
DWORD64 start_addr = 0;






bool find_pattern(Operator *op, DWORD64 start, DWORD64 stop, DWORD64 *location);
};
#endif
// Class definition for the Operator object








Operator(const byte *pattern, DWORD64 size);
~Operator();
DWORD64 size() { return _size; }












const byte start_pattern_1[] = { 0x55, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x20, 0x48, 0x8b, 0xea };










const byte start_pattern_2[] = { 0xff, 0xf3, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x20, 0x48, 0x8b, 0xd9 };











const byte start_pattern_3[] = { 0xff, 0xf3, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x20, 0x8b, 0xd9 };










const byte start_pattern_4[] = { 0x57, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x20, 0x48, 0x8b, 0xf9 };










const byte start_pattern_5[] = { 0x57, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x20, 0x8b, 0xf9 };










const byte start_pattern_6[] = { 0x57, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x20, 0x8b, 0xf1 };










const byte start_pattern_7[] = { 0xff, 0xf3, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x20, 0x48, 0x8d, 0x0d };











const byte start_pattern_8[] = { 0x57, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x40, 0x48, 0x8b, 0xe9 };










const byte start_pattern_9[] = { 0x57, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x20, 0x48, 0x8b, 0xf1 };










const byte start_pattern_10[] = { 0x57, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x20, 0x48, 0x8b, 0xe9 };










const byte start_pattern_11[] = { 0x57, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x30, 0x48, 0x8b, 0xe9 };










const byte start_pattern_12[] = { 0x57, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x20, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x05 };










const byte omva_1[] = { 0x48, 0x8b, 0x5c, 0x24, 0x30 }; // MOV RBX, [RSP+0x30]
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// stdafx.h : include file for standard system include files,
// or project specific include files that are used frequently, but













// Including SDKDDKVer.h defines the highest available Windows platform.
// If you wish to build your application for a previous Windows platform, include WinSDKVer.h and
// set the _WIN32_WINNT macro to the platform you wish to support before including SDKDDKVer.h.
#include <SDKDDKVer.h>










char* GetAddressOfData(HANDLE process, const char *data, size_t len);
int _tmain(int argc, _TCHAR* argv[]) {
// Declarations
DWORD aProcesses[1024], cbNeeded, cProcesses;
TCHAR szProcessName[MAX_PATH] = TEXT("<unknown>");
unsigned int i;
// Get All pids
if (!EnumProcesses(aProcesses, sizeof(aProcesses), &cbNeeded)){
cerr << "Failed to get all PIDs: " << GetLastError() << endl;
return -1;
}
// Get screen width
CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO csbi;
GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE), &csbi);
int dwidth = csbi.srWindow.Right - csbi.srWindow.Left;
cout << "Running Processes" << endl;
printf("%-6s %-*s\n", "PID", dwidth - 7, "Process");
cout << string(3, ’-’) << " " << string(dwidth - 7, ’-’) << endl;
cProcesses = cbNeeded / sizeof(DWORD);
for (i = 0; i < cProcesses; i++) {
if (aProcesses[i] != 0) {
HANDLE hProc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION | PROCESS_VM_READ, FALSE,
aProcesses[i]);
if (hProc != NULL) {
HMODULE hMod;
DWORD cbNeededMod;
if (EnumProcessModules(hProc, &hMod, sizeof(hMod), &cbNeededMod)) {
GetModuleBaseName(hProc, hMod, szProcessName, sizeof(szProcessName
) / sizeof(TCHAR));
}






string s_pid = "";
cout << endl << "Into which process would you like to inject faults? [PID]: ";
getline(cin, s_pid);
int pid = stoi(s_pid);
HANDLE hTarget = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, pid);
if (!hTarget) {
cerr << "Failed to open process (check your privilege): " << GetLastError() << endl;
return -1;
}
// Fault Injection or Memory Corruptions?
string s_fivsmc = "";
cout << endl << "Would you like to inject Faults, or corrupt Memory? [f|m]: ";
getline(cin, s_fivsmc);
if (s_fivsmc.find("m") != string::npos){
string s_query = "";
cout << endl << "What are you looking for in process memory?: ";
getline(cin, s_query);
char* ret = GetAddressOfData(hTarget, s_query.c_str(), s_query.length());
if (ret) {
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cout << "Found at addr: " << (void*)ret << endl;
size_t bytesRead;
size_t sizeToRead = s_query.size();
char *buf = (char *)malloc(sizeToRead + 1);
ReadProcessMemory(hTarget, ret, buf, sizeToRead, &bytesRead);
buf[sizeToRead] = ’\0’;
cout << "Num bytes read: " << bytesRead << endl;
cout << "Contents: " << string(buf) << endl;
// Overwrite it
byte *null_array = (byte *)malloc(bytesRead);
fill_n(null_array, bytesRead, 0x00);
SIZE_T mem_bytes_written = 0;
if (WriteProcessMemory(hTarget, (LPVOID)ret, null_array, bytesRead, &
mem_bytes_written) != 0) {
cout << "Bytes written: " << mem_bytes_written << endl;
cout << "Successful corruption." << endl;
return 0;
} else {








// Enumerate modules within process
HMODULE hmods[1024];
cout << "DLLs currently loaded in target process:" << endl;
printf("%-4s %-*s\n", "ID", dwidth-5, "Module Name:");
cout << string(4, ’-’) << " " << string(dwidth - 5, ’-’) << endl;
if (EnumProcessModules(hTarget, hmods, sizeof(hmods), &cbNeeded)) {
for (i = 0; i < (cbNeeded / sizeof(HMODULE)); i++) {
TCHAR szModName[MAX_PATH];
if (GetModuleFileNameEx(hTarget, hmods[i], szModName, sizeof(szModName) / sizeof
(TCHAR))) {
_tprintf(TEXT("%4d %-*s\n"), i, dwidth-5, szModName);
} else {





cerr << "Failed to enum the modules: " << GetLastError() << endl;
}
// Which Module?
string s_mod_id = "";
cout << "Into which module would you like to inject faults? [ID]: ";
getline(cin, s_mod_id);
int mod_id = stoi(s_mod_id);
MODULEINFO lModInfo = { 0 };
cout << "Dll Information:" << endl;
if (GetModuleInformation(hTarget, hmods[mod_id], &lModInfo, sizeof(lModInfo))){
cout << "\t Base Addr: " << lModInfo.lpBaseOfDll << endl;
cout << "\t Entry Point: " << lModInfo.EntryPoint << endl;
cout << "\t Size of image: " << lModInfo.SizeOfImage << endl << endl;
} else {




// Get module name
TCHAR szModName[MAX_PATH] = TEXT("<unknown>");
GetModuleFileNameEx(hTarget, hmods[mod_id], szModName, sizeof(szModName) / sizeof(TCHAR));
// Build library object
Library *library = new Library(hTarget, (DWORD64)lModInfo.lpBaseOfDll,
lModInfo.SizeOfImage, string((char *)
&szModName));
// Save library for future static analysis
library->write_library_to_disk("C:\\memdump.dll");
library->inject();






int iResult = WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2, 2), &wsaData);
if (iResult != NO_ERROR) {




ConnectSocket = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (ConnectSocket == INVALID_SOCKET) {








iResult = connect(ConnectSocket, (SOCKADDR *)&clientService, sizeof(clientService));
if (iResult == SOCKET_ERROR) {





char *sendbuf = "FAULT_INJECTED_SUCCESSFULLY";
iResult = send(ConnectSocket, sendbuf, (int)strlen(sendbuf), 0);
if (iResult == SOCKET_ERROR) {
















char* p = 0;
while(p < si.lpMaximumApplicationAddress) {




if(ReadProcessMemory(process, p, &chunk[0], info.RegionSize, &bytesRead))
for(size_t i = 0; i < (bytesRead - len); ++i)
if(memcmp(data, &chunk[i], len) == 0)













size = end_addr - start_addr;
buf = _code;
local_injection_points = map < DWORD64, Operator *>();
// Build Capstone (CS) Array of code
if (cs_open(CS_ARCH_X86, CS_MODE_64, &cs_handle) != CS_ERR_OK)
cerr << "Error disassembling code." << endl;
// Enable op details
cs_option(cs_handle, CS_OPT_DETAIL, CS_OPT_ON);
//cs_option(cs_handle, CS_OP_DETAIL, CS_OPT_ON);
cs_count = cs_disasm(cs_handle, buf, size, start_addr, 0, &code_buf);
if (cs_count == 0)
cerr << "Error disassembling code." << endl;










// For each injection point in the funciton, ask the user if they would like to inject
for (map<DWORD64, Operator *>::iterator it = local_injection_points.begin();
it != local_injection_points.end(); ++it) {














// Returns address of injection point for "Operator of Missing Localize Part of the Algorithm (OMPLA)"
bool Function::find_operators_ompla() {
// Constraint 2 (C02): Call must not be only statement in the block
if (cs_count < 10) return false;
for (size_t j = 0; j < cs_count; j++) {
if (string(code_buf[j].mnemonic).find("mov") != string::npos){
// Constraint 10: Statements must be in the same block and do not include loops
size_t c = 0;
for (size_t i = j + 1; i < cs_count; i++)




if (c > 2 && c <= 5) {
// Doesn’t violate any of the OMPLA constraints, add it







// Returns address of injection point for "Operator for Missing Function Call (OMFC)"
bool Function::find_operators_mfc() {
// Constraint 2 (C02): Call must not be only statement in the block
if (cs_count < 6) return false;
for (size_t j = 0; j < cs_count; j++) {
if (string(code_buf[j].mnemonic).find("call") != string::npos){
// Constraint 1 (C01): Return value of the function (EAX/RAX) must not be used.
bool constraint01 = false;
for (size_t i = j + 1; i < cs_count; i++) {
cs_detail *details = code_buf[i].detail;
if (code_buf[i].detail) {
for (size_t k = 0; k < details->regs_read_count; k++) {
string modreg = string(cs_reg_name(cs_handle, details->
regs_read[k]));






// Doesn’t violate any of the OMFC constraints, add it
if (!constraint01) {







bool Function::inject(Operator *op, DWORD64 addr) {
// Ready to continue?
//string cont = "";
//printf("Ready to inject %d bytes at: 0x%X\n\n", op->size(), addr);
//cout << "Continue? [Y|n]: ";
//getline(cin, cont);
//if (cont.find("n") != string::npos || cont.find("N") != string::npos) {
//cout << "Aborting" << endl;
//return false;
//}
byte *nop_array = (byte *)malloc(op->size());
byte *tmp_buf = (byte *)malloc(op->size());
fill_n(nop_array, op->size(), 0x90);
SIZE_T mem_bytes_written = 0;
if (WriteProcessMemory(hTarget, (LPVOID)addr, nop_array, op->size(), &mem_bytes_written) != 0)
{
cout << "Attemting injection..." << endl;
// Check to make sure the OS allowed the operation
SIZE_T num_bytes_read = 0;
int count = 0;
while (true) {
if (ReadProcessMemory(hTarget, (DWORD64 *)addr, tmp_buf, op->size(), &
num_bytes_read) != 0) {
cout << string((char *)tmp_buf) << endl;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < op->size(); i++) {
if (tmp_buf[i] != nop_array[i])
break;
}
if (i >= op->size() - 1) {
cout << "Bytes written: " << mem_bytes_written << endl;



















buf = (byte *)malloc(image_size);
function_patterns = map < Operator *, Operator * >();
functions = vector < Function *>();
if (!buf) {













bool Library::write_library_to_disk(string path) {
cout << "Writing static copy of memory contents for analysis to " << path << endl;
FILE *fp;
fopen_s(&fp, path.c_str(), "w");
SIZE_T bytes_written = 0;
while (bytes_written < image_size) {
bytes_written += fwrite(buf, 1, image_size, fp);
}
fclose(fp);




// For each function in the module, call public inject funciton
while (true) {










SIZE_T num_bytes_read = 0;
int count = 0;
if (ReadProcessMemory(hTarget, (DWORD64 *)start_addr, buf, image_size, &num_bytes_read) != 0)
{












function_patterns[new Operator(start_pattern_1, sizeof(start_pattern_1))] =
new Operator(end_pattern_1, sizeof(end_pattern_1));
function_patterns[new Operator(start_pattern_2, sizeof(start_pattern_2))] =
new Operator(end_pattern_2, sizeof(end_pattern_2));
function_patterns[new Operator(start_pattern_3, sizeof(start_pattern_3))] =
new Operator(end_pattern_3, sizeof(end_pattern_3));
function_patterns[new Operator(start_pattern_4, sizeof(start_pattern_4))] =
new Operator(end_pattern_4, sizeof(end_pattern_4));
function_patterns[new Operator(start_pattern_5, sizeof(start_pattern_5))] =
new Operator(end_pattern_5, sizeof(end_pattern_5));
function_patterns[new Operator(start_pattern_6, sizeof(start_pattern_6))] =
new Operator(end_pattern_6, sizeof(end_pattern_6));
function_patterns[new Operator(start_pattern_7, sizeof(start_pattern_7))] =
new Operator(end_pattern_7, sizeof(end_pattern_7));
function_patterns[new Operator(start_pattern_8, sizeof(start_pattern_8))] =
new Operator(end_pattern_8, sizeof(end_pattern_8));
function_patterns[new Operator(start_pattern_9, sizeof(start_pattern_9))] =
new Operator(end_pattern_9, sizeof(end_pattern_9));
function_patterns[new Operator(start_pattern_10, sizeof(start_pattern_10))] =
new Operator(end_pattern_10, sizeof(end_pattern_10));
function_patterns[new Operator(start_pattern_11, sizeof(start_pattern_11))] =
new Operator(end_pattern_11, sizeof(end_pattern_11));





for (map < Operator *, Operator * >::iterator it = function_patterns.begin();
it != function_patterns.end(); ++it ) {
DWORD64 begin = 0;
while (find_pattern(it->first, begin, image_size, &begin)) {
DWORD64 end = 0;
if (find_pattern(it->second, begin, image_size, &end)) {














// Search ’buf’ for ’pattern’ at ’start’. If found, sets ’offset’, and returns true.
bool Library::find_pattern(Operator *op, DWORD64 start, DWORD64 stop, DWORD64 *location) {
const byte *pattern = op->pattern();
for (DWORD64 i = start; i < stop; i++) {
if (buf[i] == pattern[0]) {
for (int j = 1; j < op->size(); j++) {
if (buf[i + j] != pattern[j])
break;
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Operator::Operator(const byte *pattern, DWORD64 size) {
_size = size;






// stdafx.cpp : source file that includes just the standard includes
// FaultInjection.pch will be the pre-compiled header
// stdafx.obj will contain the pre-compiled type information
#include "stdafx.h"
// TODO: reference any additional headers you need in STDAFX.H
// and not in this file
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Appendix B. ResourceLeak Source Code
###############################################################################
# #
# W-SWFIT: Resource Leak #
# Authors: Paul Jordan #
# Date Created: 8 May 2016 #
# Description: Makefile for the W-SWFIT Resource Leak project. #
# #




C_FILES:=$(shell find . -iname "*.cpp")
OBJS:=$(patsubst %.cpp, %.o, $(C_FILES))







$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $(PROGRAM).exe
native: $(OBJS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $(PROGRAM)
%.o: %.cpp
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
%: %.cpp
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $<
clean:




/* Project: W-SWFIT: Resource Leak */
/* Authors: Paul Jordan */
/* Date Created: 8 May 2016 */
/* */
/* Description: Small app designed to fill up memory, disk, or CPU at a */
/* configurable rate in order to force a system to fail. This application */
/* simulates a poorly written third-party application which might cause */
/* failure in an underlying system. */
/* */








int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
// Process Command Line Args
if ( argc < 3 ) {
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cerr << "Need to specify which type of leak [m]emory, or [c]pu." << endl;
cerr << "usage: "<< argv[0] <<" -[m|c] <rate>" << endl;
return 1;
}
Resource *leak = NULL;
if ( string(argv[1]).compare("-m") == 0 )
leak = new Memory();
else if ( string(argv[1]).compare("-c") == 0 )
leak = new CPU();
else {




string str_rate = string(argv[2]);
if ( ! (istringstream(str_rate) >> rate) ) rate = 0;
if (rate <= 0 || rate > 100) {











/* Project: W-SWFIT: Resource Leak */
/* Authors: Paul Jordan */
/* Date Created: 8 May 2016 */
/* Description: Implementation file for the CPU leak class. */
/* */




bool CPU::start(int rate) {
_running = true;
_rate = rate;
__rate = rate; // mutable (degrading) rate





if (__rate > 1) { __rate *= .99; }











/* Project: W-SWFIT: Resource Leak */
/* Authors: Paul Jordan */
/* Date Created: 8 May 2016 */
/* Description: Implementation file for the Memory leak class. */
/* */











bool Memory::start(int rate) {
_running = true;
_rate = rate;

















/* Project: W-SWFIT: Resource Leak */
/* Authors: Paul Jordan */
/* Date Created: 8 May 2016 */
/* Description: Header file for the CPU leak class. */
/* */













bool start(int rate); // smaller number = faster leak
bool stop();
bool running() const { return _running; }
int rate() const { return _rate; }
private:
void leak();
bool _running = false;
int _rate = 0;



















/* Project: W-SWFIT: Resource Leak */
/* Authors: Paul Jordan */
/* Date Created: 8 May 2016 */
/* Description: Header file for the Memory leak class. */
/* */












bool start(int rate); // # of milliseconds to sleep
// before allocating more memory
// (smaller number = faster leak)
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bool stop();
bool running() const { return _running; }




bool _running = false;







/* Project: W-SWFIT: Resource Leak */
/* Authors: Paul Jordan */
/* Date Created: 8 May 2016 */
/* Description: Abstract resource header file. Each resource implements */
/* abstract class. */
/* */








virtual bool start(int rate) = 0;
virtual bool stop() = 0;
bool running() const { return _running; }
int rate() const { return _rate; }
private:
bool _running = false;




Appendix C. Windows Updates
Table 13. Updates applied to Windows Server 2008 R2 x64 Edition.
Description HotFixID Description HotFixID
Update KB982861 Security Update KB2676562
Security Update KB2032276 Security Update KB2685939
Security Update KB2207559 Security Update KB2690533
Security Update KB2296011 Security Update KB2691442
Security Update KB2305420 Security Update KB2698365
Update KB2345886 Security Update KB2705219
Security Update KB2347290 Security Update KB2706045
Security Update KB2387149 Security Update KB2712808
Security Update KB2393802 Update KB2718704
Security Update KB2419640 Security Update KB2729451
Security Update KB2423089 Security Update KB2736418
Security Update KB2425227 Security Update KB2742598
Security Update KB2442962 Security Update KB2743555
Update KB2454826 Update KB2748349
Security Update KB2483614 Update KB2749655
Update KB2506014 Security Update KB2753842
Security Update KB2506212 Security Update KB2756920
Security Update KB2509553 Security Update KB2757638
Security Update KB2511455 Security Update KB2758857
Update KB2533552 Security Update KB2765809
Security Update KB2535512 Security Update KB2769369
Security Update KB2536275 Security Update KB2770660
Security Update KB2536276 Security Update KB2772930
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Security Update KB2544893 Update KB2779562
Update KB2552343 Security Update KB2785220
Security Update KB2560656 Security Update KB2789644
Security Update KB2564958 Security Update KB2790113
Security Update KB2570947 Security Update KB2790655
Security Update KB2584146 Security Update KB2807986
Security Update KB2585542 Security Update KB2813170
Security Update KB2604114 Security Update KB2813347
Security Update KB2618451 Security Update KB2840149
Security Update KB2620704 Security Update KB972270
Security Update KB2621440 Update KB974431
Security Update KB2631813 Security Update KB974571
Security Update KB2643719 Hotfix KB975467
Security Update KB2644615 Security Update KB975560
Security Update KB2645640 Update KB977074
Security Update KB2647170 Security Update KB978542
Security Update KB2653956 Security Update KB978601
Security Update KB2654428 Security Update KB979309
Security Update KB2655992 Security Update KB979482
Security Update KB2656355 Security Update KB979687
Security Update KB2656410 Security Update KB979688
Security Update KB2658846 Update KB979900
Security Update KB2659262 Update KB980408
Update KB2661254 Security Update KB982132
Security Update KB2667402 Security Update KB982799
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Appendix D. List of Abbreviations
AD Active Directory
AFP Adaptive Failure Prediction
API Application Programming Interface
ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization
AUC Area Under the Curve
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRISP-DM Cross Industry Standard Process for Data
Mining
CSCS Cyber Security and Control System
D-PLG Distributed PowerShell Load Generator
DC Domain Controller
DNS Domain Name System
DOD Department of Defense
FN False Negative
FP False Positive
FPR False Positive Rate
G-SWFIT General Software Fault Injection Technique
GB Gigabyte





NOS Network Operation Squadrons
NPV Negative Predictive Value
ODC Orthogonal Defect Classification
OFP Online Failure Prediction
PFM Proactive Fault Management
RDP Remote Desktop Protocol
ROC Receiver Operating Characteristic
SQL Structured Query Language
SVM Support Vector Machine
TN True Negative
TP True Positive
TPR True Positive Rate
VM Virtual Machine
W-SWFIT Windows Software Fault Injection Tool
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